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Introduction
In the wake of World War II─and the onslaught of Soviet expansionism─the President and the Congress were seeking processes through which other elements of governmental power, in addition to the military, could contribute to the attainment of strategic interests. Thus, the National Security Act of 1947 was born. 1 In enacting this legislation, Congress' intent was to "provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, and to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of Government relating to national security." 2 But while the overarching objectives of the National Security Act of 1947 are relatively the same now, as they were then, that is, unified interagency operations, the conditions and scope under which the objectives were developed no longer exist. That is to say, the nature of conflict itself has evolved.
Transnational terrorism, as well as other forms of international crime, affects domestic, regional, and global stability. Translated, these threats to our security include, but are not limited to, the purchase and intended use of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, hard and soft piracy, cyber-warfare, economic as well as other types of espionage, smuggling, bio-terrorism, political assassination, insurgency, fundamental extremism, genocide, illegal immigration, illegal technology transfer, counterfeiting, and chemical terrorism.
The preceding is more than just a simple recognition of transnational threats. The underlying purpose of the list is to demonstrate the multitude of potential variables resulting from so many threats operating simultaneously against our interests. More to the point, we must not view these threats as separate components within a larger category, simply because they do not operate as separate components. In other words, these threats are not just transnational in nature-they are trans-networking. As Stephen Humphreys observes, "...each of these problems has its own history, and, to a considerable degree, can be analyzed separately. But it is perfectly clear, that each is thoroughly implicated in all others and that no one of them can be solved in isolation." 3 Condoleezza Rice's perspective is similar. "When you think about it," she said, "they're not only transnational, they're transfunctional, and that means they cross all kinds of jurisdictional boundaries in the government..." 4 The magnitude, geographical dispersion, and unknown relationships between various transnational threats are such that no one department, agency, or staff has the sufficient resources or expertise to comprehend and respond to all requirements. As our challenges are expanding in size and scope, so too, must our interagency processes be flexible, adaptive, and efficient. To that end, we must develop a system that provides responsive interagency intelligence and information to the appropriate federal departments and agencies. The system must be standardized and enforceable within the federal bureaucracy so as to enhance unity of effort, yet never impinge on the authority of elected or appointed officials. A responsive interagency system that is proficient in both deliberate and crisis action planning is the only method of bringing to bear all the appropriate government assets necessary to engage the full depth and breadth of our national security threats.
The purpose of this research paper, then, is to provide an analysis of the interagency process at the strategic level─from the origins of its inefficiencies to recommendations that directly impact systemic faults. Through historical analysis, this paper will demonstrate that the problems residing within the U.S. federal interagency system are not new, but rather, consistent throughout the timeframe examined. Consequently, recommendations applied to interagency inefficiencies must take into account many of the historical issues that have set the conditions for interagency coordination failures in the past.
In the end, interagency coordination is about people, organizations, and processes. And only by analyzing interagency problems in the combined context of people, organizations, and processes can we begin to understand the depth and synthesis of the remedies required.
Problem: Presidential Autonomy and Interagency Rivalries
The current U.S. national security apparatus is founded upon the National Security Act of 1947. Since the act was passed into law, the interagency approach to national security problems has been executed through a formal process of identifying policy issues and questions, formulating options, raising issues to appropriate levels for decisions, making decisions where appropriate, and overseeing the implementation of decisions throughout the executive departments. 5 At the presidential level, the interagency process takes the form of the National Security Council (NSC). As a product of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council's goal was to unify interagency approaches to national security issues. The National Security Act of 1947 also made the NSC responsible for the general direction and coordination of intelligence operations.
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According to statute, the National Security Council is at the apex of all other interagency Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 8 Others may also sit in advisory positions, based upon presidential discretion. 9 With that said, the Council operates according to presidential preference. The NSC system "is at the mercy of particular presidents--to be used, reshaped, or ignored as they prefer." 10 In essence, the system has been left open to "each president's personality, policy preferences, and operating style..." 11 But, while the parameters have provided for presidential freedom, they have also allowed for the dynamics of internal power plays. As Amy Zegart points out, various presidents have designed the NSC system in different ways. Therefore, "its structure, operation, and power are always up for grabs." 12 If the NSC is viewed as the tip of the interagency iceberg, the NSC staff is that which falls immediately below the waterline. The bureaucratic depth of the NSC is supported by a substructure of interagency groups and by an NSC staff within the White House. A critical function of the NSC staff is to help guide federal departments and agencies in the understanding and prioritization of the President's agenda. 13 Influential in every respect, the politically appointed NSC staff endeavors, when practical, to build consensus across the government for unified policy and action.
Apart from authorizing the NSC, Congress does not oversee the interagency process. While critical to effective government, the interagency process within the NSC, and at staff levels below the NSC, has never been codified into law. So, while every President has enjoyed the freedom to mold the NSC and NSC staff in his own likeness, others have seen the disconnect between the President and Congress as a potential fault. As Harold Koh notes, "When Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947, its greatest error was its failure to address its own role in the national security system." 14 Still, Congress can influence interagency processes by holding hearings regarding past actions and specific participants involved in those actions. 15 Every new President, either directly or indirectly, influences who some of the personnel will be that will make up his NSC staff. In addition to "by name requests," NSC staffers are made up of personnel "...detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, the civil service, the military services, academia, and the private sector." 16 The modern-day National Security
Council staff consists of various geographic and functional component staffs, with the two primary committees on the staff being the Principals Committee and the Deputies Committee.
The Principals committee is essentially the National Security Council, without the President.
The Deputies committee "includes assistant secretary level officials who monitor the work of the interagency policy formulation and articulation process, do crisis management, and, when necessary, push unresolved issues to the Principals for resolution." 17 Early on, the intent for the newly activated NSC staff had been one of low-visibility in presidential affairs. However, a dramatic evolution in the primacy of the staff occurred shortly after its establishment. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy reengineered NSC staffing processes "that differed radically" from that which was originally intended by the National Security Act. 18 19 In other words, the trend was that national security policies were "gravitating" closer to the sphere of presidential staff influence, and further away from Cabinet secretariats/secretariat staffs.
There is historical justification for this "gravitational pull," however. While most presidents have entered the Oval Office with one form of bias or another regarding the NSC and its associated staff, geo-political events often sway them to centralize foreign policy planning and execution at their levels. That is to say, based on unforeseen events or poor interdepartmental coordination, presidential reactions have been to take personal control by increasing their direct influence on foreign policy matters while decreasing the influence of other executive branch departments and agencies. 20 While presidents have felt they were better able to manage the country's foreign policy affairs through centralization, there has also been a parallel history of negative impacts on the interagency process. As the President manages foreign policy through the NSC staff, the NSC staff, by default, rises in prominence. The trend has been for the NSC staff to then become an entity of federal power in its own right. The marginalization of the departments and agencies can lead to further idiosyncratic extremes. During several presidencies, the national security deliberation process was sometimes whickered down to levels that challenged the very intent of the National Security Council.
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The history of presidential administrations is replete with personality conflicts and interagency rivalries that have ebbed and flowed with departmental power and influence. "The reality" David Rothkopf writes, "is that we see it often-Kissinger vs. Rogers, Kissinger vs.
Schlesinger, Kissinger vs. Rumsfeld, Vance vs. Brzezinski, Shultz vs. Weinberger, Lake vs.
Holbrooke, and Powell vs. Rumsfeld." 23 Consequently, inter-departmental and agency rivalries develop in reaction to the rise of certain personalities in both the NSC and NSC staff. In one way or another, these personality conflicts have negatively impacted interagency information flow and planning coordination.
Problem: Organizational Cultures
Beyond the personality conflicts and interagency rivalries that exist within the interagency process, there are self-inflicted cultural wounds within the departments and agencies. These organizational idiosyncrasies further handicap inter and intra-departmental coordination processes, ultimately affecting government-wide unity of effort. Consider, for example, the State Department. As Frank Carlucci writes, "The department's professional culture is predisposed against public outreach and engagement, thus undercutting its effectiveness at public diplomacy and undermining its coordination not only with Congress, but also with other agencies of the U.S. government." This has been especially evident when the President has not given the Secretary of State principal responsibility for the implementation of foreign policy." 25 In the wake of 9/11, the State Department's influence decreased even further "as the nation and its dominant leaders had little patience for the compromise and delays of diplomacy and as foreign policy itself became militarized." 26 The CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offer other examples of organizational culture crimping the interagency process. The 9/11 Commission Report put it simply when it stated, "Information was not shared...analysis was not pooled." 27 The CIA and FBI "were unwilling...to exchange information quickly and effectively..." between their organizations. The CIA did not pass on identified terrorist information to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the FBI. 28 And because the CIA and FBI "lacked a...cooperative, analytical and operational effort, they were not well configured to detect and counter a threat like that posed on September 11..."
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Attempts to Standardize Interagency Coordination
Given the history of personalities and organizations, it should also be remembered that presidents and congresses do not work in a vacuum. To be fair, most have recognized and understood the disconnects in the interagency process, and, to their credit, have attempted to improve the process. With the intent of standardizing interagency processes, President George H. W. Bush's National Security Directive-1 (NSD-1) established specific authorities for the National Security Council's Principal's Committee and Deputy's Committee. It created the first functional and regional working groups. The idea behind this new NSC staff structure was to "push decisions down and allow the system to work issues as much as possible at the lower levels, while elevating decisions to the Principals' level later in the process." 30 Theoretically, this would promote the vetting of details at lower levels so that rapid decisions could be made at the top.
During the Clinton administration, the interagency process for developing and implementing foreign policy was described in Presidential Decision Directive-2 (PDD-2), Organization of the National Security Council. PDD-2 expanded the NSC membership beyond that mandated by law. This expansion was based on Clinton's concept of a link between national security, economic, and domestic political matters. As a result, Clinton's NSC was to be the principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy. 31 Another key aspect of PDD-2 was the development of the Interagency Working Groups (IWGs).
IWGs were a refinement of the functional and geographic working groups designed in President Bush's NSD-1. This aspect reinforced the concept of a lead federal agency and established guidelines for NSC/IWG operations. These guidelines also included what departments and/or agencies would participate in given interagency activities. 32 But because the new Clinton administration lacked some of the sophisticated know-how in establishing strategically-focused staffs, much of the foreign policy process appeared to be ad hoc. 33 PDD-2 described an interagency process, but the supporting committees did not reflect the intent. 34 As a result, the implementation of PDD-2 suffered.
The Clinton administration then approached interagency operations on two fronts-the On an international front, PDD-56 mandated reforms in the political-military planning process for overseas operations. Signed in May 1997, the goal of PDD-56 was to institutionalize procedures for the interagency to follow during crisis action planning. In a departure from previous approaches to interagency processes, PDD-56 sought to involve all potential assets of the U.S. government─and outside the government─that might be brought to bear on a complex contingency in a foreign land. 36 Armed with lessons learned from contingency operations in the first half of the 1990s, the administration's mindset was that interagency planning can make or break an operation. 37 PDD-56 addressed the interagency framework by directing that crisis action planning would generate
• an executive committee chaired by the assistant secretaries However, no procedural directive followed the NSPD, "...resulting in a situation where there was form but little management application...to effect realistic planning." 45 An attempt was made to recover from the oversight, but, due to lack of support, the revised NSPD (otherwise known as NSPD-XX) was shelved.
With that said, President George W. Bush did sign into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The primary thrust of this act is to integrate the intelligence feeds and analysis of 15 separate intelligence agencies across the federal government. 46 To execute the process of tasking federal intelligence sources, and consolidating intelligence at the top, the act created the position of Director of National Intelligence. 47 However, as former Secretary of State Colin Powell points out, the consolidation of intelligence at the top of a hierarchy such as the DNI's office does not guarantee that State (or any federal department or agency) will get timely intelligence. Second, the intelligence community, with its overarching emphasis on terrorism, will be directed to focus on "worst case" scenarios. Powell's argument is that different departments may require intelligence efforts to focus on "most likely" scenarios. As a result, he believes that intelligence needs to be tailored to specific requirements at departmental levels, versus all-encompassing national levels. Lastly, Powell argues that the consolidation of intelligence at the top will affect competitive analysis. Therefore, federal departments (where the expertise resides) should be allowed to enter into the larger analytical process versus higherlevel analysis only. 
An Alternative Solution: The Strategic Interagency Coordination Center
Interagency unity of effort sets the conditions for maximum US federal government effectiveness. This means that agencies not only need to act in concert, but that the effects of their actions must also be coordinated. Without the actions/effects linkages across the federal government, policy becomes disjointed, contradictory, or only partially effective. Individual federal agency success can be defined as an agency attaining its objectives or even establishing the long-term effects it desires. But strategic success at the federal government level must be defined as the sum total of all its efforts and their resultant long-term effects. For multiple agencies to act in concert successfully, their individual short, mid, and long term effects must be defined and coordinated so that agency under lap or overlap does not negatively impact the larger interagency effort. A process must be in place that tracks individual agency actions and effects so as to provide for overall interagency success. The history of interagency operations demonstrates inherent faults in people, organizations, and processes. In light of that history, the STRIACC provides significant advantages. From a standardization perspective, the STRIACC establishes and enforces a specific process of information and intelligence flow across all departments and agencies in the federal government.
It also ensures the greatest amount of continuity and institutional memory during presidential administration or senior cabinet member turnover. 50 The STRIACC would have minimum impact on presidential autonomy because it is not a bureaucratic entity co-located with the NSC or NSC staff. The President would still deal directly with Cabinet secretaries or agency directors. The STRIACC would reduce the potential for interagency rivalries, first, because its personnel would be hired from outside any federal agency, thereby reducing the associated departmental baggage addressed previously in this paper. Second, as a neutral coordinating element within the federal apparatus, the STRIACC would not be seen as a mechanism that favored one department or agency over another.
The STRIACC would also reduce planning interference generated by restrictive organizational cultures. It would be mandated by Congress to task, as appropriate, all departments and agencies in support of a lead federal agency. As a result, it would bypass the organizational cultural mindset within separate departments and agencies that discourages interagency activities. The STRIACC would also improve information and intelligence coordination because of its ability to task the Director of National Intelligence as well as all federal departments and agencies to provide intelligence to a lead agency as required. This capability ensures planners across the interagency have the intelligence they need to plan. 
Recommendations
Establishing the STRIACC will enable the U.S. federal government to counter transnational threats more effectively because information and intelligence will flow trans-departmentally in a timely, standardized manner. The capability to coordinate interagency effects promotes an alignment of short-, mid-, and long-term strategy. Further, problems that have historically hampered the interagency process are significantly reduced or eliminated. Therefore, the following congressional actions and changes to the National Security Act of 1947 are necessary.
First, Congress must mandate the creation of the Strategic Interagency Coordination Center.
The STRIACC charter would include establishing universal and standardized procedures for interagency information flow, intelligence, and planning. These procedures would include, at a minimum, department/agency planning alerts and notifications, information and intelligence flow formats, timelines, degree of planning content, planning deconfliction methodology, interagency planning performance standards, planning deficiency notifications, in-process reviews, plans dissemination processes, and relief from taskings. Specifically, the STRIACC would be responsible for:
• Establishing data bases/archives for presidential/congressional interagency directives.
• Receiving all executive, legislative, and judicial directives focused on interagency information and intelligence flow and planning.
• Ensuring all federal departments and agencies are updated with executive, legislative, and judicial directives.
• Ensuring government-wide dissemination of lead agency authority and intent.
• Ensuring government-wide comprehension of tasking requirements.
• Building continuity and institutional memory through interagency planning and information flow lessons learned.
• Coordinating crisis action planning and short-, mid-and long-term information and intelligence flow for the lead agency.
• Ensuring the lead agency receives all supporting department and agency information, intelligence, and plans.
• Tracking interagency actions and effects vis-à-vis a lead agency plan.
• Conducting interagency training through information and intelligence flow and planning exercises.
• Conducting yearly reviews of interagency information and intelligence flow and planning operations in preparation for annual congressional review.
• Notifying the appropriate executive and/or legislative branch elements when violations of the mandate occur. effectively in matters involving national security...other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the government relating to the national security...assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States...consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the government concerned with the national security...(see Marcella) 7 See National Security Council statutes. 8 Changed from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as a result of the 9/11 Commission. 9 For example, President Clinton incorporated the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (otherwise known as the National Security Advisor), the assistant to the President for economic policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President.
9 Non-federally employed personnel such as private businessmen can also be incorporated into NSC meetings in the role of counselors.
Iraqi pre-war intelligence, have resulted in greater centralization of decision-making processes in President George W. Bush's administration. 21 David Rothkopf, Running the World, 3. 22 During the Nixon administration, President Nixon was notoriously secretive with his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger-to the virtual exclusion of all others on the National Security Council. But the "Nixon-Kissinger only" approach to China policymaking (vis-à-vis the Vietnam war) resulted in significant strategic disconnects. The Defense Department, CIA, Vice President, and State Department were all left out of the loop during a critical negotiating period with both the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. 22 The impacts of this omission led to Secretary of State William Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird resisting cooperation within an NSC system in which they played "second fiddle" to Henry Kissinger. 22 During the Carter administration, Secretary of State Vance "was unhappy and asserted that he had not been consulted..." during certain interagency studies. The findings of the studies led to divisions and resulted in the most bitter rivalries in executive branch history─ultimately leading to Vance's resignation. 22 During the Clinton administration, the CIA and Department of Defense (DOD) felt more and more disconnected from the Oval Office as time went on. "Once again," Rothkopf reports, "an informal group close to the President was in the driver's seat, and many of those in the administration with the most foreign policy experience were reportedly frustrated in their attempts to be heard."
22 As for the current Bush administration, many see Vice President Dick Cheney as the most powerful and influential Vice President in the history of the country, many times trumping the rest of the NSC. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, another strong personality, has been accused of dealing directly with the President and simply bypassing the NSC process. 38 Gabriel Marcella, National Security and the Interagency Process, 180. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 181.
This point of "nobody in charge" is worth reinforcing because there is more to this than a "lead agency" fix. Lead agencies are designated as overall in charge in any given endeavor. But while one department may be given the lead, the organizational mindsets of the other departments or agencies may be completely disjointed from the lead agency in how they see the problem to begin with. The Department of Defense, for example, has a very set process to planning and executing operations. DOD develops Joint plans that are further refined throughout the department and geographical combatant commands. The effort, whether it has worked all the time or not, is to approach missions with a "soup to nuts" mindset. DOD deploys forces, fights wars, occupies nations, and redeploys forces. 50 Standardization is defined here as the parameters within a fixed process through which all federal departments and agencies request information and build plans. By implication, it also includes a degree of institutional memory and continuity associated with interagency information and intelligence flow and planning. The greater the amount of standardization, the greater is the advantage. Less institutional memory is lost and interagency processes become more efficient. 51 This is a modification of the current term "joint," defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as "Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. 52 In some cases, the current use of the term "Joint" would not be adjustable to the new, interagency definition. For example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee would have to be adjusted to read--the DOD Requirements Oversight Committee; the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments would have to be adjusted to read DOD Warfare Capabilities Assessments.
